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Abstract: We conduct a framed field experiment in Indonesian fishing communities with an 
eye towards evaluating the potential of Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) for 
preserving coral reef fisheries. Conducted in three culturally distinctive sites, the study 
assembles groups of five fishers who participate in a common-pool resource game. We 
implement the game with randomly assigned treatments in all sites to explore whether the 
extraction decision varies according to three recommended non-binding extraction levels 
originating from (1) a democratic process, (2) a group leader or (3) an external source that 
recommends a socially optimal extraction level. In one of the sites – that having the highest 
levels of ethnic and religious diversity – we find that democratic decision-making as well as 
information originating from outside the community promotes the cooperative behavior that 
underpins TURFs, a result that is robust to regressions controlling for individual and 
community attributes. The absence of treatment effects in the remaining two sites highlights 
that a set of formal rules may have different consequences in different communities, 
depending on underlying values and norms.  
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing destruction of coral reef ecosystems ranks among the major drivers of 
global environmental change with already more than a quarter of the world’s reefs 
irrevocably damaged from the combined effects of climate change and local stressors 
(Burke et al. 2011). Beyond serving as repositories of biodiversity and marine 
nutrients, coral reefs provide a multitude of benefits to local communities, including 
storm surge protection and livelihood from fishing and tourism. In many regions, 
coral reefs are located within open-access fisheries, making them vulnerable to 
overfishing and destructive fishing practices. The establishment of exclusive access 
privileges in the form of Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURF) reserves is 
increasingly seen as an effective response to countering this overexploitation 
(Afflerbach et al. 2014). TURFs have gained traction in recent years due in part to 
their promotion by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nevertheless, the core 
justification underpinning the implementation of TURFs – that they align the self-
interest of individual fishers with the collective stewardship of the fishery – has 
largely escaped empirical scrutiny.  
By giving fishers exclusive access to their fishing grounds, TURFs are intended to 
overcome the tragedy of the commons through an institutional framework whose 
organizing principle is community participation in monitoring and enforcement. 
Previous research suggests that democratic participation in decision making affects 
behavior and increases individuals’ willingness to cooperate. In experimental 
economics, Tyran and Feld (2006); Ertan et al. (2010); Sutter et al. (2010), Dal Bó et al. 
(2010) and Kube (2015) show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is 
greater when it is chosen democratically. Furthermore, Bardhan (2000) and Ostrom 
and Nagendra (2006) show that users of a common-pool resource tend to manage a 
resource more successfully when they are genuinely engaged in decisions regarding 
rules affecting their use. Finally, Olken (2010) conducted a public goods game in 49 
Indonesian villages and showed that democratic participation of villagers in 
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decisions about development projects resulted in higher satisfaction among the 
villagers.  
While the literature has documented instances of cooperative tendencies 
prevailing in collective management settings, there is also evidence that they perform 
differently depending on the underlying set of personal values and informal norms 
in different socio-cultural environments (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2004; Herrmann et al. 
2008). Ostrom (1992; 2000) pointed out that the effects of rules depend on 
individuals’ values and norms and may have different consequences in different 
environments. Vollan et al. (2013) show that the effect of democratic rule choice 
depends on its congruence with individual values and societal norms. Moreover, it 
has been shown that the means by which community involvement is implemented 
can have a fundamental bearing on outcomes (e.g. Agrawal & Chhatre 2006; Cinner 
& Aswani 2007; Persha et al. 2011, Cox et al. 2014). In sum, whereas community 
participation per se has been highlighted by a lot of studies as important, there is not 
a lot of information on the comparison of different decision-making processes and 
their effect in different socio-cultural environments. 
The present study addresses this issue by undertaking a framed field experiment 
in several fishing communities located in Sulawesi, Indonesia. We investigate 
whether and under what circumstances Indonesian fishers impose stringent use 
rights to decrease the exploitation of a shared resource. Our empirical set up 
consequently allows us to analyze different forms of community participation and to 
investigate how these depend on individual values and societal norms by carrying 
out the experiment in three culturally distinctive sites. Our experimental design 
employs a common-pool resource (CPR) game that introduces treatments 
corresponding to alternative mechanisms for encouraging cooperative behavior. 
Drawing on Cardenas (2004), we specifically investigate whether recommended non-
binding extraction levels originating either from a democratic decision process, a 
group leader decision or an external agent affect participants’ extraction behavior.  
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Each of the four treatments involves five individuals per group sharing a common 
pool resource. In the autonomy treatment, participants choose individually how much 
effort to spend on extracting the common resource. The remaining treatments 
include different mechanisms for recommended non-binding extraction levels. In the 
democracy treatment all five participants per group vote on an effort level. The 
median vote is selected as the recommended extraction effort. In the leader treatment, 
one group leader is randomly drawn and decides upon the non-binding recommended 
per-capita effort level on behalf of the group. In the external treatment an external 
agenda-setter gives a recommendation on a per-capita effort level.  
Among our main results, we find that both the external and democracy treatments 
have a statistically significant effect in drawing participants toward the social 
optimum in one of the three sites, that having the highest levels of ethnic and 
religious diversity. This result is robust to regressions controlling for individual and 
community level factors, which additionally reveal that the participant’s locus of 
control (i.e. perceived self-empowerment) as well as living in a non-remote village 
enhance cooperation. While the evidence suggests that democratic decision-making 
and information originating from outside the community can promote the 
cooperative behavior that underpins TURFs, the absence of effects in two of the three 
sites highlights the importance of anticipating that rules may perform differently in 
other environments depending on the underlying individual norms and values.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the background, 
community characteristics and the sampling are described. The experimental design 
is defined and predictions are developed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the 
experimental procedure and Section 5 shows the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background, Community Descriptions, and Sampling 
The Indonesian Context - Harboring the largest expanse of reefs worldwide, 
Indonesia is heavily dependent on marine resources, with 54% of the country’s 
animal protein coming from fish and seafood (Burke et al. 2011). A variety of 
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stressors, including agricultural runoff and fishing activities, have put this resource 
base under severe duress. The World Bank (2014) reports that almost 65% of 
Indonesia’s reefs are threatened by overfishing, and roughly half are threatened by 
destructive fishing practices. 
Although the Indonesian government has recognized the urgency of protecting 
the reefs, the monitoring capacities of local authorities are severely constrained, 
preventing the enforcement of existing national and regional laws enacted against 
destructive fishing practices and overfishing. Conservation NGOs have partially 
filled this void. A unifying principle of many early interventions was the 
establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). The record of MPAs, however, has 
fallen short of expectations, which has been attributed at least in part to their 
exclusive focus on conservation and to the non-involvement of local communities in 
the implementation process (Ferse et al. 2010). By bestowing local fishers with 
exclusive access to their fishing grounds in the form of territorial use rights, TURFs 
represent an integrated approach to management that couples conservation with 
economic development goals.  
As documented in a meta-study undertaken by Afflerbach and colleagues (2014), a 
common trend characterizing the creation of TURFs is a diversity of stakeholders. 
While TURFs have existed in various forms for centuries, Afflerbach and colleagues 
(2014) find that in most contemporary cases TURFs have emerged from the 
collaboration of an NGO, a governmental unit, and/or a community organization. 
Such is the situation in Indonesia, where the creation of TURFs is supported by 
international NGOs working in tandem with the Indonesian Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries and respective regional governments, which hold the authority 
to transfer property rights to the communities.  
Depending on local socio-economic, political and environmental features, NGOs 
have availed a mix of strategies to rally community support for the establishment of 
TURFs. Perhaps the most important question in gauging the scope for garnering 
support relates to the process by which a given community reaches decisions on 
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collective management. While a variety of decision-making procedures are possible, 
our experimental approach broadly distinguishes between decisions reached by way 
of a democratic process, a group leader, or through an outside entity. This division 
largely captures the alternative channels through which NGOs operating in 
Indonesia may attempt to coordinate behavior. Irrespective of governance structure, 
there may also be communities for which external input, as for example from a well-
respected scientist, is critical in gaining broad support, an aspect demonstrated by 
studies of TURFs in Japan (Uchida and Watanobe 2008) and Spain (Perez de Oliveira 
2013).  
Community Descriptions - Indonesia has a rich tapestry of cultural and ethnic 
heterogeneity. It is home to more than 300 ethnic groups, and around 700 different 
languages are spoken across its 14,000 islands. Recognizing that this diversity 
conspires against drawing samples that allow the extrapolation of findings, we 
selected three sites from a set of 12 sites in which one of the international NGOs 
working in the region is in the planning phase of a program to establish TURFs. The 
sites were supposed to be culturally distinct communities to test the extent to which 
generalizations can be drawn and with different governance structures spanning 
from hierarchical to largely democratic. All of the chosen sites are located on 
Sulawesi, the fourth biggest Indonesian island in territory and the third biggest in 
population, embodying Indonesia’s heterogeneity with at least 117 local ethnicities 
residing on the island (Ananta et al. 2015). While the main religion on the island is 
Islam, Christians are also prevalent and comprise about 20% of the population.  
Two of the sites are on Wakatobi, a small string of islands in South-East Sulawesi 
that are primarily populated by two different ethnicities: the Badjo and the Liya. 
Badjo communities’ share the trait that their livelihoods are completely organized 
around fishing, though systems of governance vary. Key informants from the Badjo 
communities in which this study was conducted characterized their system as 
democratic. On the same string of islands are the Liya communities, which are 
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hierarchically organized and whose main occupation is seaweed farming, typically 
augmented by part-time fishing.  
Both the Badjo and Liya are relatively cut-off from the remainder of the island, 
with the main transportation links being ferries and planes, whereas the third site, 
Bunaken, is situated on the main part of the island in the North-East of Sulawesi. Its 
centralized location along with its mix of ethnicities and religions makes Bunaken 
more prototypical of Sulawesi at large. While Liya and Badjo are ethnically 
homogeneous and nearly exclusively Muslim, Bunaken is represented in our sample 
by 23 different ethnicities and a religious composition that is 64% Muslim with the 
rest being mostly Christians. Governance structures in Bunaken also vary, but are 
typically comprised of a village council and a village leader who is democratically 
elected.  
Sampling and Descriptive Statistics - Sampling proceeded according to a design that 
ensured that the number of households surveyed from every village was 
proportional to the village’s population within the community. The households were 
selected by approaching every nth household from an arbitrary starting point, with n 
determined according to the number of households in the village. If a household 
declined to participate, which occurred only in three cases, the next nth household 
was approached. The sample comprises a total of 695 households distributed 
approximately evenly across the three communities. The number of villages within 
communities varies and Bunaken has 10 villages while Liya and Badjo have 4 and 3 
villages, respectively. Every head of village answered a detailed village questionnaire 
on the current situation in the village.  
In addition to one member of each household – usually the head – participating in 
the CPR game, we administered a questionnaire upon initially approaching the 
household. The questionnaire elicited information on a range of socioeconomic 
variables including social capital variables that serve as a baseline measure of 
conditions prior to the introduction of the TURF. 
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Hence, our sample consists of three different data sources. The extraction rate of 
each participant in the experiment, demographic information of the participant’s 
household as well as social capital questions, and village characteristics derived from 
the village questionnaires. Since social capital is something inherent to one person, 
we always use the participant’s own values and norms. However, due to the setting 
of first administering the household questionnaire and then inviting the participants 
to the experiment, we did not always have the same person in the experiment and 
answering the household questionnaire. In this case, we administered a very short 
questionnaire to every participant, who was sent as a household representative, 
eliciting this information.  
Note: The column all sites denotes the average value of the other three sites. Standard errors are in parentheses. Village 
characteristics are available for 17 communities.  
Table 1: Household Demographics, Social Capital Indices and Village Characteristics  
 All Sites Badjo Liya Bunaken 
     
Social Capital     
Participant trust level  0.61 0.55 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 
(Linearized index from 0 to 1)     
Participant locus of control level 0.36 0.35 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01) 0.35 (0.01) 
(Linearized index from 0 to 1)     
Association membership  0.33 0.32 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 0.40 (0.03) 
(Head of household is member in 
party or association) 
    
     
Household Demographics     
Religion of head of household 0.87 1.0 (0) 0.99 (0.0) 0.64 (0.03) 
(Islamic believer)     
Household fishing intensity 3.16 3.25 (0.15) 3.58  (0.14) 2.70 (0.14) 
(0 “Never” to 5 “More than 1-2 
times per week”) 
    
Household expenditures 301,481 423,149 (60.52) 198,297 (21.24) 286,302 
(15.18) 
(in IDR)     
Head of household gender 0.81 0.76 (0.03) 0.87 (0.02) 0.80 (0.03) 
(Male dummy)     
Head of household age 44.72 38.60 (0.95) 47.43 (0.88) 47.39 (0.77) 
(Age of head of household)     
Education of head of household 0.41 0.30 (0.03) 0.46 (0.03) 0.45 (0.03) 
(At least primary education)     
     
Village Characteristics     
Internet   
(Good internet connection) 
0.19 0.33 (0.01) 0  0.25 (0.009) 
Transit services  0.66 0.66 (0.01) 1 (0) 0.66 (0.01) 
      (Transit services available)     
     
Observations 695 225 230 240 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for a subset of these variables, which are 
subsequently used in regression analysis that explores whether the estimated 
treatment effects vary when controlling for individual, household and village 
characteristics. The majority of variables come directly from questions pertaining to 
education, religion, age and other attributes, but two are derived from a battery of 
questions directed at the respondent’s level of trust and perceived self-
empowerment, referred to as the locus of control. These questions are derived from 
the research on the locus of control1 and trust2 and then transformed into one 
indicator ranging from 0 to 1 using principal component analysis.  
3. CPR Model, Experimental Design and Predictions 
CPR model – In standard CPR games, individuals exert effort to extract a shared 
resource. Extraction is individually beneficial, but implies negative externalities (e.g. 
Ostrom et al. 1994 and Walker et al. 2000). Externalities arise whenever the extraction 
effort by one individual affects the benefits of others. In order to analyze whether 
collective decision making is an appropriate approach to increase cooperation within 
Indonesian fishing communities, we use an experimental design based on Cardenas 
(2004). The design is based on a model of a group of five (𝑛 = 5) homogenous agents 
indexed by 𝑖 who have access to a common-pool resource, e.g. a fish stock. All agents 
have a maximum labor endowment of 8 units of effort to spend and decide how 
much effort to spend on extracting, 𝑥𝑖𝜖[1,8]. The instantaneous benefits of extraction 
accruing to agent 𝑖, 𝐸𝑖, are given by:  
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖 −
1
2
𝑏𝑥𝑖
2, 
where a and b are positive constants. This implies diminishing returns from 
extraction and that instantaneous benefits received by an appropriator to be 
                                                          
1 The locus of control concept measures the person’s belief in being able to control events that affect their lives. We apply the 
method developed by Levenson (1974) to elicit the multidimensionality of the locus of control since several studies have 
acknowledged the importance of the locus of control for pro-social environmental behavior (for example, Kalamas et al (2014) 
and Engqvist and Nilsson (2014)) but its importance has also been recognized in other areas of research (see, for example, 
Caliendo et al. (2014)). The questions were readjusted to our context.  
2 The importance of trust has long been recognized in a collective action problem (Ostrom 2000). We use seven questions similar 
to those of the World Value Survey to disentangle the trust nexus from all perspectives.   
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independent of the extraction of other appropriators. Additionally, agents receive 
benefits from conserving the shared resource, Ci. Benefits from conserving the 
resource, in contrast to extracting, depend on the total level of extraction and are 
given by: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼 ∑(𝑐 − 𝑥𝑗),
5
𝑗=1
 
where α and c are positive constants. Note that this introduces a negative externality 
into the model, because an agent’s benefit from conservation decreases with total 
appropriation. Benefits from extraction, 𝐸𝑖, and conservation, 𝐶𝑖, define agent 𝑖‘s 
individual payoff: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖 =  𝑎𝑥𝑖 −
1
2
𝑏𝑥𝑖
2 +  𝛼 ∑(𝑐 − 𝑥𝑗).
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
To assure comparability to the previous literature, we use the same 
parametrization as Cardenas (2004), i.e. 𝑒 = 8, 𝑎 = 60, 𝑏 = 5, 𝛼 = 20 and 𝑐 = 800. 
Differentiation with respect to 𝑥𝑖 yields that the optimal extraction for agent 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖
∗, is 
given by: 𝑥𝑖
∗ =
𝑎−𝛼
𝑏
= 8. The social optimum, in contrast, is attained if agents extract in 
a way that maximizes the joint payoff and is given by individual extraction levels of  
𝑥𝑖
° =
𝑎−𝛼𝑛
𝑏
= 1  with 𝑥𝑖𝜖[1,8].3 
Experimental design and predictions – Our experimental design covers four 
treatments and is briefly summarized in Table 2. At the beginning of each session, 
participants were randomly assigned to groups of five. There is no change in the 
group throughout the whole experiment. In each session one of the four treatments 
was played. Each session consists of 10 static decision rounds. The experiment was 
consciously framed in such a way that participants were fully aware they are 
participating in a simulation about fishing in coral reefs.4 The design allows us to 
study the effect of alternative strategies to implement community participation in 
extraction decisions. More precisely, we test whether non-binding recommendations 
                                                          
3 Another alternative would have been to use an experimental design with interior solutions (e.g. Ostrom et al. 1994), but for 
reasons of simplicity we have decided to maintain corner solutions.  
4 The experimental introductions in English can be found in appendix B.  
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originating either from a democratic decision process, a group leader decision or an 
external agent affect cooperation behavior. 
Table 2: Experimental design 
Treatment 
Contribution 
mechanism 
Predictions Sub. (Obs.) 
autonomy 
voluntary contribution 
mechanism 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 8 180 (36) 
democracy 
median of all proposed 
contribution levels 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 8 175 (35) 
leader 
delegate sets 
contribution level 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 8 165 (33) 
external 
external 
recommendation 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 8 175 (35) 
   Total: 695 (139) 
In the autonomy treatment, which we later refer to as the baseline scenario, each 
agent autonomously decides how much effort to spend on extracting the common 
resource, i.e. chooses 𝑥𝑖𝜖[1,8], in each decision round. After each decision, agents are 
informed about the individual efforts and the corresponding payoffs. Since each 
agent decides individually, we expect agents to spend their individually optimal 
level of effort, i.e. 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 8, on extracting.  
In the democracy treatment groups set their own recommendation on how much 
effort members should spend on extracting. In each decision round agents vote on 
the recommended effort level which is, even if selected, non-binding for all group 
members. Each group member proposes a per-capita effort level, knowing that the 
median of all proposals will be selected to be the recommended effort level. The 
median of all proposals is selected and implemented as recommended per-capita 
effort level. The recommendation is non-binding and agents can extract more or less 
than recommended. 
In the leader treatment one group leader is randomly drawn among the members at 
the beginning of each decision round. This leader, who remains anonymous, decides 
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upon the non-binding recommended per-capita effort level in each decision round on 
behalf of the group.  
In the external treatment an external agenda-setter gives a recommendation on a 
per-capita effort level in each decision round, i.e. how much effort group members 
should spend on extracting. In our experiment, agents received in each decision 
round the recommendation to spend the socially optimal effort, i.e. 𝑥𝑖
° = 1. This 
recommendation is non-binding and agents can deviate from the proposed effort 
level.  
Since recommendations are always non-binding, we expect agents to maximize 
their individual payoffs and to spend their maximum amount of effort on extracting 
the resource, i.e. 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 8, in all treatments. In analyzing the results, we focus on the 
overall extraction level but also closely examine the recommendations participants 
make and whether the participants follow these recommendations in the second part 
of the analysis.  
4. Experimental Procedure  
The experiments were conducted in 17 different villages within three sites. Before 
the implementation, permission of the head of village was asked to conduct such an 
experiment. The permission was granted in every case. Note that the experimental 
procedure was the same in all cases irrespective of the treatments. After having 
answered the household questionnaire, participants received an invitation to the 
local community center where the game was conducted for the following day. They 
were randomly allocated to different groups once they had registered and entered 
the community center. One session comprised 4 groups of 5 players and lasted 10 
rounds. In total, 36 sessions were played. All groups were placed in the same room 
and the seating of the participants was arranged in a way that they could not see 
their fellow group members. Thus, the game was played anonymously, but the 
participants were obviously aware of who entered the room with them. In all the 
settings, participants knew each other since they had been living in the same village 
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for most of their life. Once all participants had taken their seats, an instructor started 
to explain the experiment.5 Note that we did not print out the instructions due to the 
low literacy level but everything was done verbally. The instructions included a 
description on the setting of the simulation being in fishery management, how own 
extraction rates are related to those of other group members and the payment. At the 
end of the instructions three examples were presented to improve the understanding 
of the participants about the procedure. Despite the respective treatments, there was 
no difference in the instructions and the examples. Then, a pilot round was played to 
help participants familiarize themselves with the task. Questions could be asked after 
the explanation of the instructions as well as after the pilot round. The questions 
were answered within the larger audience to ensure that at any time everyone had 
the same information. A large poster with the payoff table was placed in a way that 
every participant had to look at it during the presentation of the instructions. 
Laminated payoff tables were handed out to the participants before we started with 
the pilot round. The experiment only started once everyone was satisfied and 
indicated that they had understood the rules and there were no further questions to 
discuss. In case that anyone was not fluent in Bahasa Indonesia we had a translator 
who translated to the respective local language. However, this only happened twice. 
The procedure ensured that every participant fully understood the experiment.  
To each of the four groups one assistant was assigned, who guaranteed a smooth 
implementation of the experiment. In every round the participants had to select their 
extraction rate and then hand it to the group’s assistant. The assistant transmitted the 
sheets to the researchers, who entered the rates in the computer and calculated the 
respective payoff. Information about the individual extraction rate and payoff of all 
the group members were indicated on the sheet as well as the average payoff of the 
group. Thus, the participants always knew their own payoff and the payoff of all 
other group members.  
                                                          
5 In order to ensure that the instructions, which were in Bahasa Indonesia, did not suffer from any translation bias, we had them 
retranslated by an independent Bahasa Indonesia native speaker. We did not find any inconsistencies. Instructions as well as the 
payoff table can be found in appendix B and C. 
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Depending on the treatment, the procedure of the game was slightly different. 
While the baseline treatment was played as a simple CPR game, in the external 
treatment the participants were shown the social optimum individually on a sheet of 
paper in every round by their respective assistant. For the leadership treatment, a 
group leader was drawn randomly and his suggestion was then shown to every 
participant individually on a sheet of paper by the respective assistant. In the 
democracy treatment, every participant gave a recommendation and the median of 
every group of these recommendations was shown to every participant individually 
on a sheet of paper by the assistant. Care was taken to ensure that everyone 
understood the concept of the median before we started with the game.  
At the end of the game, we randomly drew one round to be paid out. On average, 
the payoff was 28,505 Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) per person. We also added a lump 
sum of 10,000 IDR per person for showing up, yielding an individual average 
earning of 38,505 IDR or 2.89 US-Dollar. This roughly corresponds to the daily 
working wage in Sulawesi, which is about 45,000 IDR. 
5. Results 
Our experiment generated data on 695 individuals over 10 rounds. We begin with 
a pooled analysis that compares mean extraction rates under the baseline and the 
three treatments. Thereafter, we perform the same comparison separately for each of 
the three sites. This is followed by random effects regressions controlling for 
individual heterogeneity in measuring treatment effects. Last, we assess the extent to 
which participants follow the recommendations reached under the democracy and 
external treatments.  
Turning first to the pooled baseline results, Figure 1 illustrates that participants 
extract on average 4.3 hours, a level that remains relatively stable throughout the 
experiment. While contrary to the hypothesis that players gravitate toward a 
dominant strategy of maximum extraction, this result is similar to the baseline results 
obtained in Cardenas (2004). The pattern of extraction under the three treatments is 
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similarly stable over the rounds of the game. In the case of the democracy and 
leadership treatments, a Mann-Whitney U test confirms what visual inspection 
suggests: the mean extraction levels of 4.1 hours and 4.3 hours are statistically 
indistinguishable from the baseline level.6 The recommendations from an external 
source, by contrast, lead to an average extraction rate of 3.6 hours, which is 
significantly different from the baseline at the 1 percent level. 
 
Figure 1: Mean extraction effort over time in all sites
Note: Average extraction efforts over periods across all participants in all sites. The CPR Nash equilibrium is 8 units extracted 
whereas the social optimum is 1 unit.  
Having demonstrated in Section 2 the socioeconomic heterogeneity prevailing in 
Sulawesi, we extend the analysis by splitting the sample into the three sites to gauge 
the consistency in the findings. Figure 2 reveals that the statistically significant effect 
of the external treatment in the pooled analysis is driven by one site, Bunaken, whose 
extraction rate of 3 hours is roughly 1.8 hours below the site’s relatively high baseline 
level of 4.8 hours (p < 0.01). The democracy and leadership treatments are likewise 
statistically significant in Bunaken at the one percent level, albeit with reductions in 
the extraction level that are substantially lower in magnitude than under the external 
                                                          
6 Note that all p-values specified in this section except those from the random effects model are obtained using a Mann-Whitney 
U test. 
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treatment. In Liya and Badjo, by contrast, none of the treatments significantly bear on 
the extraction rate relative to each site’s baseline extraction levels of 4 and 4.1 hours.  
Figure 2: Mean extraction effort over time by sites
Note: Average extraction effort over periods across all participants from Badjo (left), Liya (middle) and Bunaken (right). The 
CPR Nash equilibrium is 8 units extracted whereas the social optimum is 1 unit.  
To explore the robustness of these unconditional comparisons, we estimate two 
random effects models that include the socioeconomic variables presented in Table 2 
as controls for individual heterogeneity. This results in a loss of about 180 
observations owing to instances when a shortened version of the questionnaire was 
administered because the participant in the CPR game was not present at the 
household at the time of the interview. When this was the case, we did not record 
information on the locus of control. As shown in appendix A, the exclusion of this 
variable from the specification does not affect the remaining coefficient estimates 
markedly.  
The first model in Table 3 includes dummies for the three treatment effects, but, as 
in the initial unconditional analysis presented in Figure 1, does not allow for 
differential effects by site. The coefficient on the external dummy is statistically 
significant at the one percent level and indicates a reduction in the extraction of 
about 0.67 hours, which is just slightly lower than the magnitude of the 
unconditional comparison. A statistically significant effect is likewise seen for the 
democracy treatment, which is associated with a reduction in the extraction rate of 
0.34 hours. The model additionally reveals that behavior varies with socioeconomic 
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factors. Three of the control variables – the locus of control, household expenditure, 
and transit services – are statistically significant at the 5% level or below, all of which 
have negative associations with extraction.  
 
Table 3: Random effects estimation for extraction effort 
Dependent variable Extraction effort Extraction effort 
 (1) (2) 
Democracy -0.338** -1.241*** 
 (0.171) (0.303) 
Leadership -0.0451 -0.430 
 (0.195) (0.364) 
External -0.673*** -1.661*** 
 (0.220) (0.346) 
Liya  -0.743** 
  (0.376) 
Badjo  -1.596*** 
  (0.383) 
Democracy x Liya  0.807** 
  (0.381) 
Democracy x Badjo  1.946*** 
  (0.482) 
Leadership x Liya  0.222 
  (0.517) 
Leadership x Badjo  0.777 
  (0.474) 
External x Liya  1.260** 
  (0.510) 
External x Badjo  1.925*** 
  (0.508) 
Trust Index   0.459 -0.0193 
 (0.438) (0.459) 
Locus of Control  -1.185*** -1.226*** 
 (0.418) (0.415) 
Association Membership -0.109 -0.0573 
 (0.148) (0.140) 
Primary Education -0.138 -0.230* 
 (0.136) (0.139) 
Muslim 0.228 0.530* 
 (0.223) (0.319) 
Fishing Intensity -0.0859 -0.0591 
 (0.0553) (0.0558) 
Household Expenditures (in IDR) -2.02e-08** -1.47e-08 
 (7.95e-09) (9.03e-09) 
Gender 0.111 0.0821 
 (0.249) (0.228) 
Age  0.000706 -9.29e-05 
 (0.00609) (0.00627) 
Internet -0.133 -0.413** 
 (0.169) (0.191) 
Transit Services -0.671*** -0.779*** 
 (0.143) (0.208) 
Round -0.0110 -0.0110 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Constant 5.190*** 6.090*** 
 (0.532) (0.561) 
Observations 4,380 4,380 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01. 
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The second model in the table expands on the first by including site dummies and 
their interactions with the treatments to allow the magnitude of the treatment effect 
to vary by site. Several of these effects are seen to be statistically significant, but the 
resulting proliferation of coefficients makes it difficult to gauge their magnitude. To 
ease interpretation, Figure 3 presents estimates of the deviation from the baseline by 
treatment and for each site, along with the corresponding 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 3: Estimated treatment effects by sites 
Note: Estimated treatment effects based on regression model in column (2) of Table 2. Confidence intervals at the 95%-level. 
 
As in the unconditional analysis presented in Figure 2, this comparison again shows 
small and statistically insignificant effects of the treatments in Liya and Badjo. In 
Bunaken, by contrast, both the democracy and external treatments have statistically 
significant effects in lowering the extraction rate, by about 1.3 and 1.7 hours, 
respectively. The more flexible specification of model 2 also alters the interpretation 
of some of the control variables. Unlike in model 1, household expenditures are no 
longer statistically significant, while the dummy indicating a good internet 
connection is highly significant and suggests a decrease in the extraction rate of 
about 0.41 hours, a three-fold increase in magnitude relative to model 1. The locus of 
control index remains significant at a 1 percent level and increases in magnitude, 
with a one standard deviation increase in the index associated with a 0.44 decrease in 
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the hours of extraction. Similar increases in magnitude are seen for the dummies 
indicating public transit, religion, and primary school education.  
Next, we analyze participants recommended extraction efforts and if those 
recommendations are followed. In two treatments, democracy and leadership, 
recommended extraction efforts are set by the participants themselves. Across all 
sites and periods, participants recommend extracting on average less in democracy 
than in leadership (3.9 vs. 4.3, p<0.01). 
Controlling for the different sites where the experiment has been conducted reveals 
that this effect is driven by participants in Liya (see Figure 4). In Liya, the mean 
recommended extraction effort of 3.8 hours in democracy is roughly 0.6 hours below 
the recommendations in leadership (3.8 vs. 4.4, p<0.01). In Badjo and Bunaken we do 
not find a statistically significant difference between the recommendations in 
democracy and leadership.  
 
Figure 4: Mean recommended extraction effort over time by sites
Note: Average recommended extraction effort over periods across all participants from Badjo (left), Liya (middle) and Bunaken 
(right). The CPR Nash equilibrium is 8 units extracted whereas the social optimum is 1 unit.  
 
A final question concerns the issue of compliance, and specifically whether the 
recommended extraction levels emerging from the treatments differ from those 
actually selected by the participants. Figure 5 presents these differences by treatment 
and site, with negative differences indicating the extent to which the recommended 
extraction level falls below the chosen one, that is, the extent of non-compliance. For 
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the case of the leadership and democracy treatments, this difference, at -0.009 and 
0.187 (aggregated across sites), is negligible in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant. An explanation for this result, at least in the case of Badjo and Liya, is 
that the recommendations themselves were not particularly stringent and did not 
diverge markedly from what participants would have selected otherwise. By 
contrast, the aggregated difference of -2.56 in the case of the external treatment is 
substantial and highly significant (p < 0.01). 
 
Figure 5: Mean differences between recommendations and extraction efforts over time by sites 
Note: Average difference between recommendations and actual extraction efforts over periods across all participants from 
Badjo (left), Liya (middle) and Bunaken (right).  
 
Focusing on Bunaken, the only site where the external treatment significantly 
reduced extraction, the difference of about -2 between the recommended and actually 
levels is relatively large. It is illuminating to compare this result with the democracy 
treatment in Bunaken. In this case, there is no significant difference between the 
recommended and actual extraction level, even though this recommendation had a 
statistically significant effect in pulling participants toward the social optimum. 
Taken together, these results point to a higher compliance with the democracy 
treatment, but a stronger effect of the external treatment in lowering the level of 
extraction, notwithstanding the treatment’s weaker level of compliance. 
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6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This study examined collective resource management among fishing communities 
on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. The island, one of the most biologically diverse 
expanses of coral reef fisheries globally, has been subject to extensive degradation 
from overfishing (Burke et al. 2011). In response, international NGOs and regional 
governments have teamed to coordinate the establishment of TURFs, community-
based management regimes that harness locally available monitoring and 
enforcement capacities for regulating access to the fishery. The experiment is an ex 
ante analysis of the establishment of a TURF reserve that is being overseen by an 
environmental NGO. By implementing our experiment before the rollout of an actual 
program, we are able to provide evidence that can facilitate a more efficient 
implementation of the program, thereby bridging science and practice.  
Using a common pool resource game conducted in three sites on the island, we 
explored alternative strategies for garnering the requisite coordination to maintain a 
TURF. The game involves individual fishers selecting a desired level of harvesting 
activity varying between one and eight hours per day, with payoffs calibrated such 
that each player’s dominant strategy is to select the maximum harvesting level. 
Experimental treatments were introduced that consisted of three different non-
binding resource extraction recommendations originating from a democratic process, 
a group leader decision or an external source that recommends a socially optimal 
level.  
Three main findings emerge. First, the most effective treatment in drawing players 
toward the social optimum is the external recommendation, suggesting that outside 
expert advice and information campaigns from respected sources may be useful in 
promoting coordination. Second, while this finding was obtained for the sample as a 
whole, a disaggregate analysis revealed it to hold only in one of the three sites, 
Bunaken, illustrating that the mechanisms for fostering cooperation can lead to 
different outcomes among groups living in similar biophysical environments (e.g. 
Herrmann et al. 2008). Third, the degree of individual non-compliance with the 
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recommendation was highest for the external treatment; it was of a negligible 
magnitude for the leadership and democracy treatments, the latter of which also had a 
statistically significant effect in reducing extraction in Bunaken.  
From a policy perspective, the low compliance but high extraction reduction of the 
external treatment together with the high compliance but somewhat lower extraction 
reduction of the democracy treatment suggests some promise for coupling external 
advocacy of the social optimum with a community-based democratic decision 
process. However, the absence of this effect in two of the sites shows that caution is 
warranted in generalizing this conclusion to other sites in which TURFs are being 
considered. Further research should thus be directed at disentangling the root of this 
difference in ethnically homogeneous sites such as those analyzed in this study. 
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Appendix 
A. Random effects model for extraction effort without locus of control 
Dependent Variable Extraction effort Extraction effort 
 (1) (2) 
   
Democracy -0.185 -0.935*** 
 (0.156) (0.280) 
Leadership 0.0297 -0.334 
 (0.168) (0.338) 
External -0.556*** -1.538*** 
 (0.196) (0.333) 
Liya  -0.625* 
  (0.360) 
Badjo  -1.205*** 
  (0.356) 
Democracy x Liya  0.748** 
  (0.355) 
Democracy x Badjo  1.708*** 
  (0.450) 
Leadership x Liya  0.443 
  (0.465) 
Leadership x Badjo  0.663 
  (0.441) 
External x Liya  1.364*** 
  (0.461) 
External x Badjo  1.848*** 
  (0.473) 
Trust Index 0.541 0.297 
 (0.407) (0.431) 
Association Membership -0.0396 -0.00283 
 (0.133) (0.129) 
Primary Education -0.171 -0.187 
 (0.125) (0.127) 
Muslim 0.223 0.341 
 (0.208) (0.305) 
Fishing Intensity -0.0271 -0.00721 
 (0.0313) (0.0306) 
Household Expenditure (in IDR) -1.26e-08 -1.01e-08 
 (9.54e-09) (1.02e-08) 
Gender 0.193 0.163 
 (0.191) (0.180) 
Age 0.00276 0.00317 
 (0.00515) (0.00521) 
Internet -0.216 -0.462*** 
 (0.148) (0.174) 
Transit Services -0.614*** -0.689*** 
 (0.129) (0.196) 
Round -0.0111 -0.0111 
 (0.00900) (0.00901) 
Constant 4.161*** 4.809*** 
 (0.431) (0.461) 
   
Observations 5,780 5,780 
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B. Experimental Introduction and Procedure 
B.1. Verbal Introduction (translated into English) 
Hello, Good Afternoon/evening... 
My Name is...from UI and RWI. As already mentioned in the survey we are here for a research project 
about fishing behavior. As a complimentary part of our research, we are going to have a simulation. 
To guarantee a smooth process, we need to establish some rules first:  
Please do not talk to each other and do not use any electronic devices such as mobile phones, smart 
phones, or the like throughout the whole game. If you want to go to restroom, please do it now 
because we will have the simulation for about 2 hours. If any of you want to go to restroom, you may 
go now. We won’t give permission to go to the restroom when the simulation has begun. During the 
game, you make your decisions anonymously. Only the researchers will know your identity and your 
data will be treated confidentially.  
In order to make these projects as useful as possible to the local population we heavily depend on 
exact, truthful, and comprehensive information 
Are you ready? 
B.2.: Verbal Instructions (translated into English) 
General Information (Note: this information was given to all participants) 
In this simulation, you will be sharing a small fish site with four other people. You profit in two 
different ways from the fish site. By fishing you will earn money, but at the same time you receive 
benefits from conserving the fish stock. This means, if you refrain from fishing you will help the fish 
population to grow more sustainable and secure the future of the fish population. At the same time, 
a more amenable habitat will attract tourists from outside, who pay for the conserved environment. 
A healthy fish stock will then pay out for you in the future.  
You will be asked to decide on the amount of time you spend for fishing. Please note that the more 
time you use for fishing, the more fish you will get. HOWEVER, at the time you will also reduce the 
stock of fish, which also means decreasing the profit gained from fish conservation as well as future 
gains from the fish population. 
[Only for externality: Before you make a decision, you will get an official recommendation about how 
much time you should spend for fishing. Please notice that EVEN THOUGH this is an official 
recommendation, it is not binding. This means that you and the other four people who share this fish 
site can spend more or less time fishing than officially recommended]. 
[Only for democracy: In this simulation, you will be deciding together in your group about the 
number of hours each participant should spend fishing. Each of the group members will propose how 
many hours each participant should spend fishing. Following this, the median of all the proposals, 
which is the third highest value proposed by your group, will be treated as the recommended time 
duration to fish for every member of the team. Please notice that EVEN THOUGH this is a 
recommendation, it is not binding. This means that you and the other four people who share this fish 
site can spend more or less time fishing than recommended] 
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[Only for the group leader: Before you make a decision, you will get a recommendation about the 
length of time to fish. This recommendation will be made by the head of this group. This leader will 
be randomly chosen at the time when the simulation starts. Please notice that EVEN THOUGH this is 
a recommendation, it is not binding. This means that you and the other four people who share this 
fish site can spend more or less time fishing than recommended] 
In this simulation, you can earn money, to an amount depending on your decisions and your group 
members’ decisions. The decisions you take will determine how much you can earn during the course 
of the simulation, so please take your time and make your decisions after thinking carefully. This 
simulation will go on for ten separate rounds, during which you will play the same exercise and 
interact with the same four people. In each round you can earn money, and at the end of the 
simulation we will randomly draw one round and this round will then be paid out. Thus, each of your 
decisions may be the one that will be paid out in the end, so always think carefully about your 
decisions.  
Autonomy treatment (Note: This information was given only to the participants in the autonomy 
treatment) 
Remember that in this simulation you will be sharing a small fish site with four other people. You will 
get benefits from the fish stock in two ways; earning money from fishing or from preserving the fish 
stock for the future. Your task now is to decide how many hours you want to spend fishing each day. 
You can spend between one and eight hours fishing per day. Remember, the more hours you spend 
fishing, the more fish you will catch, but the lower the fish stock. Please remember, the simulation 
consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the same simulation and interact with the 
same four people. After each round, you will be informed about the amount of fish caught and the 
payoffs of all the players in your group. Please be aware that all the group members face the same 
decision like you. Your total earnings in each round depend on:  
 The number of hours you spend fishing 
 The number of hours the other 4 group members spend fishing 
The payoff table shows that the amount of your earning depending on the time that you and the 
other group members spend fishing per day. Remember your payoff depends on how many hours 
you and your group members spend fishing per day. Please note, your payoff increases with the 
hours you spend fishing, but the more hours you and your group spend on fishing, the lower is your 
benefit from conserving the fish stock. 
1 Example: Imagine that you and the other group members spent one hour per day for activities 
related to fisheries. This means that you and your group members would get 37880 Rupiah at the 
end of the round.  
2nd Example: Imagine that you and all the other group members spent eight hours per day for 
activities related to fisheries. This means that you and the other group members would get 16000 
Rupiah  at the end of the round.  
3rd Example: Imagine that the other group members spent together ten hours per day for activities 
related to fisheries and you spend one hour per day for activities related to fisheries. This means that 
you would get 31880 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
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4th Example: Imagine that the other group members spent together ten hours per day with activities 
related to fisheries and you spend eight hours per day for activities related to fisheries. This means 
that you would get 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
We will now play one round to help you to familiarize yourself with the simulation. This round will 
not count for the payoff. 
[Pilot] 
Are there any more questions? If not, I will began the game. And please, be reminded that no 
smartphones are allowed in this room, you should not talk to each other, and there is no permission 
to go to the restroom after the simulation has begun without losing all your payoffs. 
External Treatment (Note: this information was given only to participants in the external treatment) 
Remember that in this simulation you will be sharing a small fish site together with four other 
people. You can earn money either by fishing, or by conserving the fish stock. Your task now is to 
decide how many hours you want to spend fishing.  
Please notice that before you make your decision, you will receive an official recommendation on 
how much hours to spend fishing. This recommendation is official, but not binding. This means that 
you and the other group member can spend more or less hours fishing than officially recommended.  
Remember that the more hours you spend fishing, the larger the amount of fish you are catching, 
however, the smaller the stock of the fish. The same conditions apply to the other four people in 
your group. Remember the simulation consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the 
same exercise and interact with the same four people in your group.  
After each round, you will be informed about the amount of fish caught and the payoffs of all the 
other players in your group. Please be aware that all of the group members face the same decision 
like you. Your total earnings in each round depend on:  
 The number of hours you spend fishing 
 The number of hours the other 4 group members spend fishing 
The payoff table shows the amount of your earning depending on the time that you and the other 
group members spend fishing per day. Remember your payoff depends on how many hours you and 
your group members spend fishing per day. Please note, your payoff increase with the hours you 
spend fishing, but the more hours you and your group spend on fishing, the lower is your benefit 
from conserving fish stock.  
1st Example: Imagine that you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish. You and all 
other group members follow this recommendation and spend one hour per day fishing. Then you and 
the other group members earn 37880 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
2nd Example: Imagine that you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish, but you and 
all the group members spend eight hours per day fishing. Then you and the other group members 
earn 16000 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
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3rd Example: Imagine that you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish. Then you 
spent exactly one hour per day to fish, but the other group members spent together ten hours per 
day to fish. Then you earn 31880 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
4th Example: Imagine that you get a recommendation to spend one hour per day to fish. However, it 
turns out that the other group members spent together ten hours per day fishing, and you spent 
eight hours per day fishing. Then you earn 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
We will now play one round to help you to familiarize yourself with the simulation. This round will 
not count for the payoff. 
[Pilot] 
Are there any more questions? If not, I will began the game. And please, be reminded that no 
smartphones are allowed in this room, you should not talk to each other, and there is no permission 
to go to the restroom after the simulation has begun without losing all your payoffs. 
Democratcy Treatment (Note: This information was given only to participants in the democracy 
Treatment) 
Remember that in this simulation you will be sharing a small fish site together with four other 
people. You can earn money either by fishing, or by conserving the fish stock. Your task now is to 
decide how many hours you want to spend fishing.  
Please note that in this simulation you decide together with the other four group members how 
many hours each group member should spend fishing. Each of the group members can spend 
between one and eight hours fishing each day. To decide collectively, each of the group members has 
to propose how many hours each group member should spend fishing. Afterwards, the median of all 
proposals will be imposed as non-binding recommendation. In other words, you and the other four 
group members should spend the median of all proposed hours fishing. Please notice that this 
recommendation is not binding, meaning that you and the other group members can spend more or 
less hours to fishing than recommended.  
Remember that the more hours you spend fishing, the larger the amount of fish you are catching, 
however, the smaller the stock of the fish. The same conditions apply to the other four people in 
your group. Remember the simulation consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the 
same exercise and interact with the same four people in your group.  
After each round, you will be informed about the amount of fish caught and the payoffs of all the 
other players in your group. Please be aware that all of the group members face the same decision 
like you. Your total earnings in each round depend on:  
 The number of hours you spend fishing 
 The number of hours the other 4 group members spend fishing 
The payoff table shows that the amount of your earning depending on the time that you and the 
other group members spend for fishing per day. Remember your payoff depends on how many hours 
you and your group members spend fishing per day. Please note, your payoff increases with the 
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hours you spend fishing, but the more hours you spend on fishing, the lower your benefit from 
conserving the fish stock.  
1st Example: Imagine that you proposed to spend 1 hour per day to fish, and the four other group 
members proposed to spend 2, 4, 6, and 8 hours per day fishing. This means that you and all the 
group members should spend 4 hours per day on fishing.  
2nd Example: Imagine that you proposed to spend 8 hour per day to fish, and the other four group 
members proposed to spend 1, 2, 4, and 6 hours per day fishing. This means that you and all the 
group members should spend 4 hours per day on fishing 
[Make clear that the previous examples were about the choosing mechanisms of the median. Now 
examples of the second step in the simulation.]  
3rd Example: Imagine that you and all the group members proposed to spend one hour per day on 
fishing. This means that you and all the group members should spend 1 hour per day on fishing. By 
assuming that you and all the other group members follow this proposal you and all of the group 
members will earn 37880 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
4th Example: Imagine that you and all the group members proposed to spend eight hours per day on 
fishing. This means that you and all the group members should spend 8 hour per day on fishing. By 
assuming that you and all the other group members follow this proposal you and all the group 
members will earn 16000 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
5th Example: Imagine that you and all the group members proposed to spend 3 hours per day on 
fishing. However, all of the other group members together spend 10 hours per day on fishing and you 
spend one hour per day on fishing. Then you earn 31880 Rupiah at the end of the round. 
6th Example: Imagine that you and all the group members proposed to spend 3 hours per day on 
fishing. However,  that all of the other group members together spend 10 hours per day on fishing 
and you spend 8 hours per day on fishing. Then you earn 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
We will now play one round to help you to familiarize yourself with the simulation. This round will 
not count for the payoff. 
[Pilot] 
Are there any more questions? If not, I will began the game. And please, be reminded that no 
smartphones are allowed in this room, you should not talk to each other, and there is no permission 
to go to the restroom after the simulation has begun without losing all your payoffs. 
Leader Treatment (Note: this information was given only to participants in the Leader Treatment) 
Remember that in this simulation you will be sharing a small fish site with four other people. You can 
earn money by fishing, or by conserving the fish stock. Your task now is to decide how many hours 
you want to spend fishing. 
Please note, that at the beginning of each round one of the group members is selected randomly to 
become the group leader. The person chosen will be informed about the outcome whereas those not 
chosen will be informed about this outcome as well. The responsibility of the leader is to provide a 
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recommendation on how many hours to be spent by each group member on fishing. This 
recommendation is not binding, meaning that you and the group members can spend more or less 
hours fishing than recommended. 
Remember that the more hours you spend fishing, the large the amount of fish you are catching, 
however, the smaller the stock of the fish. The same conditions apply to the other four people in 
your group. Remember the simulation consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the 
same exercise and interact with the same four people in your group.  
After each round, you will be informed about the amount of fish caught and the payoffs of all the 
other players in your group. Please be aware that all of the group members face the same decision 
like you. Your total earnings in each in each round depend on:  
 The number of hours you spend fishing 
 The number of hours the other 4 group members spend fishing 
The payoff table shows the amount of your earning depending on the time that you and the other 
group members spend fishing per day. Remember your payoff depends on how many hours you and 
your group members spend fishing per day. Please note, your payoff increase with the hours you 
spend fishing, but the more hours you spend on fishing, the lower your benefit from conserving the 
fish stock.  
1st Example: Imagine that you were recommended to spend one hour per day to fish. You and all the 
other group members follow this recommendation. Then you and your group members earn 37880 
Rupiah at the end of the round.  
2nd Example: Imagine that you were recommended to spend one hour per day to fish, but you and 
all the other group members spend eight hours per day on fishing. Then you and your group 
members earn 16000 coins at the end of the round.  
3rd Example: Imagine that you were recommended to spend one hour per day to fish. You spend 
only one hour on fishing per day but the other group members spend ten hours per day fishing. Then 
you earn 31880 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
4th Example: Imagine that you were recommended to spend to spend one hour per day to fish. 
However, the other group members spend 10 hours per day fishing, and you spend 8 hours per day 
fishing. Then you earn 38000 Rupiah at the end of the round.  
We will now play one round to help you to familiarize yourself with the simulation. This round will 
not count for the payoff. 
 [Play the pilot] 
Are there any more questions? If not, I will began the game. And please, be reminded that no 
smartphones are allowed in this room, you should not talk to each other, and there is no permission 
to go to the restroom after the simulation has begun without losing all your payoffs. 
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Appendix C: Payoff Table in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 
Their effort extracting  
(in total hours) 
My effort extracting ( in hours) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4 37880 39500 40880 42000 42880 43500 43880 44000 
5 36880 38500 39880 41000 41880 42500 42880 43000 
6 35880 37500 38880 40000 40880 41500 41880 42000 
7 34880 36500 37880 39000 39880 40500 40880 41000 
8 33880 35500 36880 38000 38880 39500 39880 40000 
9 32880 34500 35880 37000 37880 38500 38880 39000 
10 31880 33500 34880 36000 36880 37500 37880 38000 
11 30880 32500 33880 35000 35880 36500 36880 37000 
12 29880 31500 32880 34000 34880 35500 35880 36000 
13 28880 30500 31880 33000 33880 34500 34880 35000 
14 27880 29500 30880 32000 32880 33500 33880 34000 
15 26880 28500 29880 31000 31880 32500 32880 33000 
16 25880 27500 28880 30000 30880 31500 31880 32000 
17 24880 26500 27880 29000 29880 30500 30880 31000 
18 23880 25500 26880 28000 28880 29500 29880 30000 
19 22880 24500 25880 27000 27880 28500 28880 29000 
20 21880 23500 24880 26000 26880 27500 27880 28000 
21 20880 22500 23880 25000 25880 26500 26880 27000 
22 19880 21500 22880 24000 24880 25500 25880 26000 
23 18880 20500 21880 23000 23880 24500 24880 25000 
24 17880 19500 20880 22000 22880 23500 23880 24000 
25 16880 18500 19880 21000 21880 22500 22880 23000 
26 15880 17500 18880 20000 20880 21500 21880 22000 
27 14880 16500 17880 19000 19880 20500 20880 21000 
28 13880 15500 16880 18000 18880 19500 19880 20000 
29 12880 14500 15880 17000 17880 18500 18880 19000 
30 11880 13500 14880 16000 16880 17500 17880 18000 
31 10880 12500 13880 15000 15880 16500 16880 17000 
32 9880 11500 12880 14000 14880 15500 15880 16000 
 
